This paper presents two new identity-based threshold ring signature schemes. With these schemes, any group of t entities spontaneously conscript arbitrarily n − t entities to generate a publicly verifiable t-out-of-n signature on behalf of the group of n members, yet the actual signers remain anonymous. The schemes are proven to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks (EUF-IBTRS-CMIA) and unconditional signer ambiguity under the random oracle model.
Introduction
Traditional public key infrastructure requires a trusted certification authority to issue a certificate binding the identity and the public key of an entity. So we are confronted with the problem of certificate management. To solve the problem, Shamir defined identity based public key cryptography [17] , which needs a trusted private key generator (PKG) to generate a private key for an entity according to his identity.
In 2001, Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [13] first formalized the concept of the ring signature based on a trapdoor one-way function. With a ring signature scheme, a signer can choose several members to form a ring and generate a ring signature without the assistance of the other ring members. The generated ring signature can convince an arbitrary verifier that a message was signed by a member of the ring, but no one can identify the real signer among the ring members.
In identity-based cryptography, PKG does not need to maintain a list of issued certificates. Each user only needs to store the system parameters instead of the certificates of other users. Group-oriented signature schemes enable an entity of a group to produce a signature on behalf of the group. In a group signature scheme, the group is predefined and there is a group manager who can revoke the anonymity. In a ring signature scheme, there is no anonymity revocation mechanism, and setup stage is not needed to produce and distribute a group secret explicitly [4] . Identity-based ring signature is a 1-out-of-n individuals signature, identity-based threshold ring signature is the t-out-of-n threshold version where t or more entities can jointly generate a valid signature but t − 1 or fewer entities cannot.
Related work
Since ring signature was first formalized, many practical ring signature schemes and their variants have been proposed, such as threshold ring signature [2] and identity-based ring signatures [3, 7] . Ring signature schemes based on standard assumptions without random oracles were proposed in [1, 6, 16] . The first identity-based ring signature was proposed in [20] . Identity-based ring signatures from RSA were proposed in [10] . Identity-based ring signatures with constant-size signatures were proposed in [5, 12] .
Some threshold ring signature schemes with special properties were proposed. Liu et al. [11] proposed separable threshold ring signature scheme, in which various flavors of public keys can be used in a single threshold ring signature; the authors gave the generic construction of threshold ring signature from any trapdoor-one-way type signature scheme and three-move type signature scheme. However, the correctness and the security of this construction were not illustrated except the specific instantiations from RSA [14] and Schnorr signature [15] . Tsang et al. [18] proposed separable linkable threshold ring signatures, which enable anyone to determine if two ring signatures were signed by the same signer. Chan et al. [8] constructed blind threshold ring signature. Chow et al. [3] constructed the first identity-based threshold ring signature. Chung et al. [9] constructed identity-based threshold signature scheme without polynomial. Xiong et al. [19] proposed identity-based threshold ring signature without pairings.
Motivations and our contributions
Although some good results were achieved in speeding up the computation of pairing function in recent years, it is still interesting to design cryptographic scheme with less pairing operations. In the literature, the most efficient identitybased threshold ring signature scheme is [3] , in which the number of pairing computations grows linearly with size of the group. On the other hand, in most threshold ring signature schemes, the polynomial is employed. There are only several identity-based threshold ring signature schemes [9] which do not employ polynomial.
In this paper, we propose two new identity-based threshold ring signature schemes, which have the following features:
• The proposed schemes are proven to be secure under the random oracle model.
• The proposed scheme 1 is very efficient. Scheme 1 only requires 2 pairing operations in verification and none of them in signing. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme 1 is the most efficient ID-based threshold ring signature.
• There is not polynomial employed in scheme 2.
Preliminaries

Bilinear pairing
Let G 1 and G 2 be cyclic groups of prime order p with the multiplicative group action. Also, g is a generator of G 1 . Let 
Model of identity-based threshold ring signature
An identity-based ring signature scheme consists of the following four algorithms: Setup, Key Extraction, Sign, and Verify:
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, a trusted private key center (PKG) generates the system's public parameters and the master private key.
• Key Extraction: Given the user's identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the PKG uses the master private key to compute the corresponding private key S ID and delivers it to the user via an authenticated channel.
• Sign: t signers form a set W , then choose n − t other users to form n users group L including themselves and compute sign(M, L, ID∈W S ID ) on behalf of the group L to obtain the signature σ for message M.
• Verify: On a threshold ring signature σ , a message M, the threshold value t and the group of signers' identities L = {ID 1 , · · · , ID n } as the input, it outputs for "true" or ⊥ for "false", depending on whether σ is a valid signature signed by at least t members in the group L on a message M.
Definition 2. An ID-based threshold ring signature scheme (IBTRS) is said to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message-and-identity attacks (EUF-IBTRS-CMIA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
Initialization. The challenger runs the setup algorithm with a security parameter k and gives the system parameters to the adversary A.
Query. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries, A can make his queries adaptively: every query may depend on the answers to the previous ones.
• Hash functions query: A can ask for the values of the hash functions for any input.
• Key Extraction query: A chooses an identity ID. C computes S ID = Key Extraction(ID) and sends the result to A.
• Sign query: A chooses a group of n users' identities L = {ID 1 , · · · , ID n }, a threshold value t (t ≤ n), and any message M.
C outputs a (t, n) ID-based threshold ring signature σ .
Forge. The adversary A outputs an ID-based threshold ring signature σ on message M "signed" by at least t members (t ≤ n) of a group of n users L = {ID 1 , · · · , ID n } and the following conditions hold:
1. (M, L) does not appear in the set of previous sign queries.
2. There are at most t − 1 members in L whose private key was queried. 
Proposed scheme 1
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, a trusted private key generator (PKG) chooses two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p, a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 and picks two cryptographic hash functions
Next, PKG picks a generator g ∈ G 1 , randomly chooses x ∈ Z * p and computes y = g x . The public system parameters are • Sign: Let L be the set of all identities of the n users. Without loss of generality, we assume users indexed by {1, 2, · · · , t} are the participating signers while users indexed by {t + 1, t + 2, · · · , n} are the non-participating signers. The participating signers carry out the following steps to give an ID-based threshold ring signature on message M.
The actual signer ID s randomly chooses
).
2. Other actual signer ID j randomly chooses r j ∈ Z * p and computes
3. Anyone in the group of t participating signers who got the knowledge of
5. Anyone in the group of t participating signers who got the knowledge of
• Verify: A verifier can check whether a signature σ = {t, n k=1 {U k }, V , f } for the message M is given by at least t signers from the set of users L as follows:
1. Checks if the degree of polynomial f is n − t and
Proceeds if both conditions are true, rejects otherwise. V ) . If the equality holds, returns . Otherwise, returns ⊥. 
Computes
h k = f (k) for k = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Checking whether e( y,
C will run A as a subroutine and act as A s challenger in the EUF-IBTRS-CMIA game.
Initialization. At the beginning of the game, C runs the setup program with the parameter k, gives A the system parameters
Queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the queries are distinct and A will ask for H 1 (ID) before ID is used in any other queries.
• where W is the actual signer set. Otherwise, C does as follows: To do so we keep all the random tapes in two invocations of A the same except h 0 returned by H 2 query of the forged message. In our scheme,
Stores the relationship
A only requested for the private key of some t − 1 members in the group. For simplicity, we assume users indexed by {1, 2, · · · , t − 1} are the signers whose private key are requested by A and ID t = ID * . We have h i = h i for i = t + 1, t + 2, · · · , n and h i = h i for i = 1, 2, · · · , t. Given A derived from A, we can solve the CDHP by computing:
Probability. The probability that A did not ask a key extraction query on ID * is
. The probability that ID * is a member of the group is n−t+1
. The probability that ID * is a participating signer (hence
If the attacker A can succeed with the probability ε, the probability for C to succeed is:
Theorem 2. Scheme 1 has the unconditional signer ambiguity property.
Proof. The polynomial f with degree n − t can be considered as a function chosen randomly from the collection of all polynomials over Z p with degree n − t since h t+1 , · · · , h n are randomly generated and h 0 is the output of the random oracle H 2 . U i is chosen randomly from G 1 for i = t + 1, · · · , n, and r j is chosen randomly from Z * p for j = 1, · · · , t. So n k=1 {U k } and V are independent and distributed uniformly. Therefore, for any fixed message M and fixed set of identities L, the distribution of {t,
and uniformly distributed no matter which t participating signers are. So we conclude that even an adversary with all the private keys corresponding to the set of identities L and unbounded computing resources has no advantage in identifying any one of the participating signers over random guessing.
Proposed scheme 2
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, a trusted private key generator (PKG) chooses two groups • Sign: Let L be the set of all identities of the n users. Without loss of generality, we assume users indexed by {1, 2, · · · , t} are the participating signers while users indexed by {t + 1, t + 2, · · · , n} are the non-participating signers. The participating signers carry out the following steps to give an ID-based threshold ring signature on message M:
1. Each signer randomly chooses R j ∈ G 1 and computes
Anyone in the group of t participating signers who got the knowledge of t+1 j=2 {c j } randomly chooses A i ∈ G 1 and computes (where the index n + 1 is consider modulo n) {A k } for the message M is given by at least t signers from the set of users L as follows (where the indexes r + t, r + t − 1, 
If the equality holds, returns . Otherwise, returns ⊥. C will run A as a subroutine and act as A s challenger in the EUF-IBTRS-CMIA game.
• . The probability that
If the attacker A can succeed with the probability ε, the probability for C to succeed is: {A k }} is independent and uniformly distributed no matter which t participating signers are. So we conclude that even an adversary with all the private keys corresponding to the set of identities L and unbounded computing resources has no advantage in identifying any one of the participating signers over random guessing.
Efficiency and conclusion
Taken into account the computational costs for signature generation and verification, [3] uses n +1 pairing operations and 4n exponentiation operations. Our scheme 1 requires only 2 pairing operations and 2n + 1 exponentiation operations. Our scheme 2 is not efficient, however, it does not employ polynomial and it is more efficient than schemes in [9] . Considering the signature size, our scheme 2 is far less than it is in [9] .
We have compared our schemes with several schemes below: In this paper, we present two new identity-based threshold ring signature schemes and prove the security of our schemes in the random oracle model. Scheme 1 requires 2 pairing operations in verification and none of them in signing. Scheme 2 does not employ polynomial. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme 1 is the most efficient identity-based threshold ring signature scheme from pairings, our scheme 2 is the most efficient identity-based threshold ring signature scheme from pairings without polynomial.
